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Introduction
Throughout history, destruction and loss of cultural heritage have constantly occurred as a consequence of fanatic iconoclasm or as 'collateral' effects of armed conflicts. As early as 391 AD, the Roman Emperor Theodosius ordered the demolition of the Temple of Serapis in Alexandria, to obliterate the last refuge of non-Christians. In 1992, Hindu extremists were intent on the destruction of the sixteenth-century Babri Mosque. 1 In more recent times, the Balkan wars have offered the desolate spectacle of the devastation of Bosnia's mosques. Extensive looting and forced transfers of cultural objects have accompanied almost every war.
2 Aerial bombardments during the Second World War and in the hundred-plus armed conflicts that have plagued humanity since 1945 have contributed to the destruction and disappearance of much cultural heritage of great importance for countries of origin and for humanity as a whole.
The violent destruction of the great rock sculptures of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by military and para-military forces of Afghanistan's Taliban government in March 2001 could be viewed as an ordinary example in this history of cultural infamy. Closer scrutiny, however, shows that the violent acts themselves, and the perverse modalities of their execution present various new features in the pathology of State behaviour toward cultural heritage.
First, unlike traditional war damage to cultural heritage, which affects the enemy's property, the demolition of the Buddhas of Bamiyan concerns the Afghan Nation's heritage. They were located on its territory and belonged to its ancient pre-Islamic past.
Second, the purpose of the destruction was not linked in any way to a military objective, but inspired by the sheer will to eradicate any cultural manifestation of religious or spiritual creativity that did not correspond to the Taliban view of religion and culture.
Third, the modalities of the execution differ considerably from other similar instances of destruction in the course of recent armed conflicts. For instance, during the Balkan war of the 1990s and during the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, extensive destruction of cultural property occurred as a result of wanton bombardment, as in the case of Dubrovnik, or under the impulse of ethnic hatred. In the case of the Afghan Buddhas, demolition was carefully planned, painstakingly announced to the media all over the world, and cynically documented in all its phases of preparation, bombing and ultimate destruction.
Fourth, to the knowledge of the authors, this episode is the first planned and deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great importance as act of defiance of the United Nations and of the international community. It is no mystery that the Taliban's decision to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan came in the wake of sanctions adopted in These elements explain the shock with which UNESCO and the international community as a whole reacted to the destruction of the Buddhas. 5 There was great concern for the moral depravity shown by the perpetrators of such acts, and certain anxiety regarding the role of international law in preventing and suppressing such a form of cultural vandalism which, in the words of the UNESCO Director General, can constitute a 'crime against culture'. This paper is particularly focused on the latter point. It addresses the legal consequences under international law of the deliberate destruction by a state of cultural heritage of great importance located in its territory and representing a cultural or religious tradition cherished by other states. In the following sections we will try to introduce the historical and political context that led to the destruction of the Buddhas. We shall then address three distinct problems: 1) whether such destruction may be characterized as an internationally wrongful act despite the fact that it was perpetrated within the territorial jurisdiction of Afghanistan; 2) if so, what kind of measures may be adopted at the international level to sanction this type of governmental action; and 3) what is the role of international law regarding the eventual/ possible individual criminal liability of the members of the armed forces or para-military groups who plan and carry out destruction of cultural heritage of significant value to humanity.
The Destruction of the Buddhas in Context
The Taliban ('The Seekers') was formed in 1994 by a group of graduates of Pakistani Islamic colleges on the border with Afghanistan. The members of the group were led by Mullah (village-level religious leader) Mohammed Omar, a man who is said to have 6 See 'Who is Mullah Mohammad Omar?', at www.afghan-web.com/politics/omar.html 7 See UNHCR, 'Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan', Geneva, June 1997, at www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/cdr/cdrafg.htm, at 2.4. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 9. lost one of his eyes fighting against the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan. 6 The Taliban advocated an 'Islamic Revolution' in Afghanistan, aimed at the re-establishment of the unity of the country in the framework of the Islamic law Sharia. 7 Immediately after their rise, the Taliban were supported by most of the civilian population, frustrated by the situation of civil war persisting in the country since the end of 1970s. In particular, Afghanis were seduced by the hope of stability and restoration of peace promised by the Taliban, who seemed to be successful in stamping out corruption and improving living conditions. 8 For this reason, from 1994 the Taliban bid to gain effective power over Afghanistan had progressively intensified. At the critical date of the destruction of Buddhas, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, established by the Taliban, covered some 90-95 per cent of the Afghan territory, including the capital Kabul. The rest of the territory, concentrated in the far Northeast of the country, was still under the power of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, headed by the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan ('United Front' or 'Northern Front') that was led by B. Rabbani. 9 Even though the Taliban movement had gained effective control of the greatest part of the Afghan territory at the end of the 1990s, the international community did not view this control as conferring the attributes of legitimacy on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Only a very small group of States (i.e., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) had recognized the Taliban militia as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Afghan UN seat was still held by the delegation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, 10 which also retained control over most of the country's embassies abroad. President Rabbani continued to be acknowledged by most members of the international community, including Iran and Russia, as the rightful leader of Afghanistan.
War operations had intensified since June 2000 with the Taliban and the United Front receiving support, respectively, from Pakistan on one side, and Iran, Russia, and some other former Soviet Republics on the other. 11 NGOs have reported that both warring factions systematically violated international humanitarian law and basic rights of individuals by burning houses, raping women, torturing, and executing See Human Rights Watch, supra note 9; UNHCR, 'Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan', supra note 7, at 1.2, according to which in 1996 the refugee population from Afghanistan was the largest in the world, standing at 2,628,550, while the number of internally displaced in Afghanistan reached 1,200,000 as of 31 December 1996. See also UN General AssemblySecurity Council, 'The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security ' 16 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 9. According to World Food Program officials, in 2001, 3.8 million Afghan people were facing severe shortage or absolute lack of food (See Suarez, supra note 15; see also UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/43, at 53, according to which in the past two years Afghanistan's grain production has fallen by more than 50 per cent, and now satisfies less than half of the whole national grain requirement); it was estimated that in 2001 the internal food production deficit amounted to 2.3 million tonnes, more than double the figure for 1999 (see UN Doc. A/55/346, at 29). Even before the beginning of the civil war, Afghanistan was among the world's poorest countries, but it did not experience the grinding poverty typical of ex-colonial societies characterized by a foreign economic dependence that generally magnifies social and economic disparities. In fact, it was characterized by a rural society where human relationships were based on a system of solidarity and mutual help among social groups, which, in principle, maintained a fair distribution of resources (see B. R. Rubin, 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', Sweden, 21 June 1999, available at www.afghan-politics.org, at 3). individuals suspected of supporting the opposite side.
12 For this reason, on 23 January 2001, Amnesty International urged the United States to support the establishment of an international tribunal for Afghanistan to investigate massacres perpetrated by the warring factions. 13 In 2001, Afghanistan was estimated to have been at war for more than twenty years. One of the worst consequences of the conflict is the contamination of the Afghan territory with landmines. The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan coordinated by the United Nations estimated a known state area of 715 square kilometres was contaminated by landmines. Of this area, 333 square kilometres are considered as having a vital role for the accomplishment of basic social and economic human activities.
14 Moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, during the war Afghanistan has lost a third of its population, with some 1.5 million people believed to have died and another 5 million fled as refugees to foreign countries. 15 Despite the promises made by the Taliban, Afghanistan has managed to reach the world's lowest life expectancy in 2001 and, together with Somalia, is one of the two hungriest countries in the world. 17 See Rubin, supra note 16, at 6. 18 Actually, Afghanistan is estimated to produce 75 per cent of the world's raw opium, with a harvest estimated at 2800 tons in 1998 (see Suarez, supra note 15; Rubin, supra note 16, at 10). For the first time, on 27 July 2000 the Taliban supreme leader Mohammed Omar issued a decree imposing a complete ban on opium poppy cultivation in the controlled territory of Afghanistan (see UN Doc. The persistence of war operations had led to a broad monetization of economic and social relations in the late 1990s, combined with hyper-inflation and the destruction of most of the subsistence economy. 17 Such sudden change has produced abject poverty and the transformation of the internal economy into a system where, until recently, a significant part of the national income was obtained by the production and the trade in opium. 18 It may be supposed that by banning production of opium nationwide, the Taliban regime had sought to mitigate its isolation on the international scene by addressing one of the main requirements most often reiterated by the community of States. Similarly, the Taliban tried to take steps with regard to the discriminatory policy on grounds of gender, by relaxing the prior strict ban on female education and by re-instituting the celebration of International Women's Day on 8 March. 19 However, these types of measures, though welcome ones, were nearly insignificant in a general context where conditions for women in territories subject to Taliban domination were virtually institutionalized slavery.
Gender discrimination, together with a generally dramatic disregard of basic human rights, 20 was one of the consequences of the extreme religious intolerance that characterized the Taliban regime. Such intolerance included an absolute lack of freedom of expression and a total ban on pictures. 21 It is in this context of obscurantism that a decree promulgated by Mullah Omar on 8 January 2001 punished Afghans who converted from Islam to Judaism or Christianity with the death penalty.
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Religious extremism and intolerance were not extraneous to the Taliban's decision to promote international terrorism. They hosted and supported Saudi Arabian dissident Osama Bin Laden in his fight against the 'imperialism of Western countries', particularly by opening Afghan territory to his training camps for terrorists. 23 Such support prompted the UN Security Council's decision to adopt broad economic sanctions against the Taliban 24 and led to the concurrent downgrading of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, which, following the Afghan refusal to extradite Bin Laden, recalled its chargé d'affaires from Kabul. 25 The Taliban leaders' response was that they would not take action against Bin Laden, who was considered a guest in their country, and that any attempt to 'try to change our ideology with 26 These words have been pronounced by the Taliban leader Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi; see Suarez, supra note 15. 27 See infra note 45. 32 The text of the edict clearly expresses the beliefs and intentions pursued by the Taliban, and needs no further comment.
In view of the fatwa (religious edict) of prominent Afghan scholars and the verdict of the Afghan Supreme Court it has been decided to break down all statues/idols present in different parts of the country. This is because these idols have been gods of the infidels, and these are respected even now and perhaps maybe turned into gods again. The real God is only Allah, and all other false gods should be removed. As has already been pointed out in section 1, the acts of systematic and deliberate destruction of cultural heritage perpetrated by the Taliban raise several questions for the purposes of this study. The first is whether such acts are to be viewed as internationally wrongful acts, notwithstanding the fact that they are aimed at objects located within the territory and the effective jurisdiction of the acting government. The second question assesses whether sanctions against the offending state are permissible and/or advisable; and the third question is whether individual perpetrators should be held accountable and how they could be prosecuted. We shall try to address these three questions in the following sections.
Is the Deliberate Destruction of Afghan Cultural Heritage an Internationally Wrongful Act, and, if so, What Sanctions are Permissible?
International law typically enforces international legal obligations by the use of countermeasures. When a state commits an internationally wrongful act, the affected governments may resort to adopting reprisals, i.e. the commission of normally unlawful acts, but which are not deemed to be wrongful when such acts are countermeasures directed against a prior violation of international law. A softer form of countermeasure is retorsion, which is an unfriendly, but not illicit, act (such as the suspension of diplomatic relationships with the target state).
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When countermeasures are adopted at a collective level, for instance in the context of an international organization, it is assumed that they come from the international community as a whole, and they are therefore usually called sanctions. In the last decades, the meaning of the term 'sanctions' has been widened to include measures that are taken unilaterally by a government which is not directly affected by the violation giving rise to the countermeasure, against those states that are considered responsible for violating norms that protect values belonging to the international community as a whole (like, e.g., fundamental human rights, peace, etc.). In the latter case, the state using sanctions does not act to protect its own national interests, but operates as an agent of the international community. As a consequence, the word 'sanctions' actually covers both collective (i.e. those decided by international organizations) and unilateral sanctions.
The legality of international sanctions, especially those adopted unilaterally, is a subject of intense debate. 40 However, an act may come under the category of international sanctions only if it fulfills two basic requirements. First of all, the target of the sanction must be a subject of international law. In addition, the sanction must have a legal basis in the system of international law itself. A completely different matter, of course, is whether such sanctions are effective and useful. We shall deal with this question in section 4.D.
A The Relevance of Non-Recognition of the Taliban Regime
Once assumed that the typical subject of international law is the state, the first basic requirement for a sanction to be 'international' is that it is adopted against a state. International practice shows that the concept of 'state' as the target of sanctions is based on the substantive element of effective territorial sovereignty rather than on the formal recognition of statehood by the other members of the international community, or in the context of international organizations. The main example of such practice is the case of sanctions taken by the UN Security Council against the self-proclaimed independent government of Southern Rhodesia, formed by the leader of the white minority, I. Smith, and based on a policy of apartheid. 41 Southern Rhodesia was still a British colony, albeit self-governing, when, on 11 November 1965, the Smith government unilaterally proclaimed its independence, to continue white rule in Rhodesia and to prevent the normal constitutional progress towards independence from leading to black majority rule. After this event, the United Kingdom continued to claim its own sovereignty and, under Security Council Resolution 216 (1965) and General Assembly Resolution 2397 (1968), no government recognized Southern Rhodesia as a state. Thus, the Smith government was internationally considered as a rebel, and not a legal regime. This fact did not prevent the Security Council from imposing sanctions on the white South Rhodesian government based on the effectivity of its regime. These sanctions were continued until 1980, 42 when Zimbabwe reached its independence under the principle of self-determination.
The case of Southern Rhodesia demonstrates that effective sovereignty over a territory is the only necessary requirement for imposing sanctions on a government, irrespective of whether such government may technically be considered a state under international law. 43 As a consequence, the existence of the condition of a de facto government in international law, and the lack of legitimacy of such a government, should not have been a legal obstacle precluding the international community from imposing sanctions against the Taliban since the Taliban regime had effective control over 90-95 per cent of the Afghan territory, and effectively exercised governmental control over this territory and over Afghan people.
B Legal Basis for Sanctions
Once the existence of the subjective element has been addressed, it is necessary to ascertain whether the objective requirement of a breach of international law consisting in the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage also exists. This question is closely linked to the epistemological problem of who is competent to note the existence of such breach.
In this regard, sanctions authorized by the UN Security Council are surely the most reliable, since it can arguably be said that they emanate from the international community as a whole. They are also effective in the sense that they are binding on UN members. In addition, the collective character of this kind of sanction reduces the possibility that they be misused for interests different from those pursued by the sanctions themselves. In the case of Afghan cultural heritage, the drawback is that Article 39 of the UN Charter requires, as a strict condition for the imposition or recommendation of sanctions by the Security Council, at least the existence of a threat to the peace. In the case of Afghanistan, one could assume that the civil war, which has lasted for more than twenty years, may effectively entail a threat to international peace. But the destruction of cultural heritage in itself can not be reasonably said to reach the threshold of a 'threat' under Article 39. It is arguably for this reason that the Security Council has not adopted specific sanctions against Afghanistan as a consequence of the wrongful act of destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan.
However, there are options available, other than Security Council sanctions, which are consistent with principles of international law. First of all, one should not rule out sanctions included in the concept of 'retorsion', since these kinds of measures do not constitute, in principle, violations of international law. As a consequence, for example, all members of the international community could, in principle, adopt measures restricting trade with regard to a state committing offences against culture. There is no obstacle if that state is not party to the World Trade Organization. 44 If it is a party, commercial sanctions need to be justified under the exceptions provided by articles XX and XXI of GATT and, in the event of a dispute, adjudication is mandatory under the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
In addition, sanctions included in the concept of 'reprisals' may also be legal. Afghanistan, by destroying its cultural heritage, has in effect failed to respect several obligations incumbent upon it under specific treaty provisions and customary international law. First of all, such destruction gives rise to a breach of duties falling to Afghanistan under its membership to the 1972 World Heritage Convention. The joint reading of these provisions makes it clear that membership in the World Heritage Convention obliges state parties to conserve and protect their own cultural properties even if these are not inscribed in the World Heritage List. As for the Bamiyan Buddhas, there is no doubt that they are included in the concept of cultural heritage relevant to the Convention. 46 Regardless of whether they meet the standard of 'outstanding universal value' set forth in Article 1, the Buddhas were certainly 'works of monumental sculpture' and of generally recognized historical importance. There is no doubt that the deliberate, wanton destruction of the great Buddhas is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the 1972 Convention. The World Heritage 47 See supra note 28 and corresponding text. 48 Generally on this issue see S. E. Nalhik, 'La protection internationale des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé', in 120 RdC (1967, I), at 65; A. F. Panzera, La tutela internazionale dei beni culturali in tempo di guerra (1993); Francioni, 'Patrimonio culturale, sovranità degli Stati e conflitti armati', in G. Feliciani (ed.), Beni culturali di interesse religioso (1995), at 149; Gioia, 'La protezione dei beni culturali nei conflitti armati', in F. Francioni Since Afghanistan was, at the relevant time, beset by civil war, this analysis must turn now to the relevant norms on the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflicts. 48 Several treaty instruments, pertaining both to the protection of cultural heritage and iure in bello or humanitarian law, are applicable in this context. 49 Firstly, the protection of cultural properties was included in the conventions on the laws and customs of war concluded in The Hague between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. In particular, Article 27 of the Regulations annexed to the Convention IV of 1907 50 provided that
[i]n sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
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The Hague conventions on the laws and customs of war only applied to international armed conflicts, 52 and only where all belligerent states were party to the conventions themselves (so-called si omnes clause). However, the previous provision demonstrates that, at the time, protecting cultural heritage was already a common concern to the international community. 53 The limitations referred to above, which greatly impaired the effectivity of the Hague conventions, were excluded from the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts. 54 In particular, 55 Generally on the 1954 Convention see Nalhik, supra note 48, at 120; Panzera, supra note 48, at 30 and 72; Gioia, supra note 48, at 76. Although, this provision would be, according to article I, applicable in principle to the Afghan situation, 58 such application is precluded by the fact that Afghanistan has never ratified the Protocol. 59 However, the fact that Afghanistan is not a party to all the main treaties on the protection of cultural heritage from deliberate destruction, except the 1972 World Heritage Convention, does not rule out the existence of an obligation for the government which has the effective control over the territory to prevent and avoid acts of systematic destruction of the Afghan cultural heritage. Such a duty derives from at least two customary norms that have been formed by international practice in the field of protection of cultural heritage.
The first of these customary norms lies in the principle according to which cultural heritage constitutes part of the general interest of the international community as a whole. This principle has its theoretical foundation in the concept of erga omnes 60 See infra note 88 and corresponding text. See supra note 53.
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For a detailed examination of the relevant part of these recommendations see Francioni, supra note 48, at 152; Id., 'Principi e criteri ispiratori per la protezione internazionale del patrimonio culturale', in Francioni, Del Vecchio, and De Caterini supra note 48, at 14 (the author notes that the relevance of these recommendations, for the formation of a customary norm in the field, is given by their reiterated repetition and by the fact that they are adopted by the UNESCO General Conference, which represents almost all members of the international community). 64 1956 UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archeological Excavations, available in the UNESCO web site, at www.unesco.org/culture/laws/archaeological/html eng/page1.shtml (see, in particular, the fourth sentence of the Preamble). 65 See supra note 54.
obligations formulated by the International Court of Justice in the well-known Barcelona Traction case. 60 In this case, the Court distinguished between norms that create bilateral obligations of reciprocal character, binding upon individual states inter se, and norms that create international obligations erga omnes, or obligations owed to all states, in the public interest. This category includes norms concerning the prohibition of force, the protection of basic human rights, or the protection of the general environment against massive degradation. In our view, the prohibition of acts of willful and systematic destruction of cultural heritage of great importance for humanity also falls in the category of erga omnes obligations. There are several instances of international practice to confirm the existence of such obligation. As early in 1907, the Hague Conventions on land warfare and on naval bombardment declared that historic monuments and buildings dedicated to art and science ought to be spared by military violence. 61 The Roerich Pact of 1935 went further, to proclaim the principle that museums, monuments, and scientific and cultural institutions are to be protected as part of 'common heritage of all people'.
62 UNESCO has systematically restated this principle since the early 1950s. Considering the high rate of ratification of the World Heritage Convention, 67 as well as the authoritative character of UNESCO recommendations, which represent in effect the near totality of the nations of the world that participate in the General Conference, it is not possible to deny that a general opinio juris exists in the international community on the binding character of principles prohibiting deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of significant importance for humanity. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the protection of cultural heritage as a matter of public interest, and not only as part of private property rights, is recognized in most of the advanced domestic legal systems in the world. No civilized state, under the meaning of this term in Article 38(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, recognizes a right for the private owner of an important work of art to destroy it as part of the exercise of a supposedly unlimited right of private property. Catalogue and inventory of national treasures are generally intended to limit such private rights in view of safeguarding the public interest in the conservation and transmission of the cultural heritage to future generations. 68 In the case of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, the injury to the international public interest, which was to conserve these monuments and prevent their destruction, was all the more apparent because a) the destruction was motivated by invidious and discriminatory intent; b) it was systematic; and c) it was carried out in blatant defiance of appeals coming from UNESCO, the UN, ICOMOS, and many individual states.
The second customary principle relevant to the present analysis relates to the prohibition of acts of violence against cultural heritage in the event of armed conflicts.
69 Such a principle may be based on a consistent and unambiguous practice, which is demonstrated by developments in international law subsequent to the Hague conventions on the laws and customs of war. The customary character of the prohibition of destruction of cultural goods (more precisely, 'destruction or willful damage to institutions dedicated to religion') during armed conflicts has been expressly confirmed by the ICTY in a recent judgment, in which both defendants, Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, have been found guilty of such a crime against cultural property due to their deliberate armed attacks on ancient mosques of Bosnia Herzegovina. 75 According to the Tribunal, the act in question, 76 Ibid., para. 207. 77 See supra note 72. 78 See 81 See supra text at note 76. 82 See supra text at note 33. when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent, amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of a people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes against humanity', for all of humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious culture and its concomitant cultural objects. 76 The Hague Tribunal thus held that this kind of crime may amount to an act of persecution included in the concept of 'crimes against humanity' provided for by Article 5(h) of the Statute.
77 Doing so, the Tribunal confirmed what it had already stated in one of its earlier judgments. 78 The same conclusion had been previously reached by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 79 and the International Law Commission. 80 There is a strong argument that the description of the crime against culture as persecution, as given by the ICTY in Prosecutor v Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, 81 should also fit the factual situation in the case of the destruction of Afghan cultural heritage perpetrated by the Taliban. In this case, the discriminatory intent of destroying all signs of religions different from Islam was declared by the Taliban themselves. 82 We are aware that one may object to the applicability of the customary principle that prohibits the commission of acts of violence against cultural property in internal armed conflicts. Such objection lies in the fact that this principle should be limited to international conflicts, to situations of military occupation of foreign territory, and not be applicable to opposite factions fighting in non-international armed conflicts. However, the universal value of cultural heritage seems to exclude such a conceptual discrimination. In the last decades, international practice has extended the scope of application of all main principles of humanitarian law, originally meant for international armed conflicts, to civil wars, ethnic conflicts and conflicts of a non-international character. This is obvious in the text of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, 83 and in the recent statutes of international criminal tribunals. This analysis leads us to conclude that the willful and discriminatory destruction of the great Buddhas of Bamiyan perpetrated by the Taliban in March 2001 constitutes a breach of customary international law forbidding the wanton destruction of cultural heritage. Additionally, such destruction is a specific breach of the World Heritage Convention's commitment to ensuring protection of cultural heritage located in the territory of state parties. 85 The Taliban themselves are responsible for this breach, which, in the light of recent precedents cited above, may amount to an international crime.
Having established this, it becomes apparent which subjects of international law are thus injured by such violation. International norms relating to cultural heritage consider the destruction of any nation's cultural property as a loss and an injury to the collective heritage of humankind's civilization. The duty not to destroy cultural heritage, therefore, is nothing but a manifestation of an erga omnes obligation. In the Afghan case, the erga omnes character of the obligation is confirmed by the fact that there is no directly and materially injured third state, since the act of violence is committed in the territory and against a value pertaining to the transgressor state as such. In other words, faced with a customary obligation limiting the power that the territorial state has over assets that belong to its sovereignty, such an obligation may exist only with regard to the international community as a whole, and thus, a fortiori, with regard to all states. It follows that every state, unilaterally or in the context of an international organization, may adopt appropriate measures as a reaction to the wrongful act committed by the Taliban against the cultural heritage located in its territory.
The deliberate and systematic destruction of cultural properties of pre-Islamic Afghanistan and, more particularly, of the Bamiyan Buddhas, insofar as this heritage constitutes a representation of both a religious belief and of the cultural identity of a people, could also be viewed as a violation of certain human rights, namely the right to the preservation of one's own culture and the right to practice and obtain respect of one's own religion. 86 The destruction of religious symbols certainly is inconsistent with cultural diversity and religious toleration. However, considering the fact that the Buddhas of Bamiyan were no longer actively used in the exercise of religious rights, this argument hardly provides an independent basis for a breach of international law and for the consequent imposition of international sanctions. 87 See supra section 4.B. 
C Implementation of Sanctions
In the preceding section we ascertained that there is sufficient legal basis in contemporary international law for adopting sanctions against a state which commits crimes against culture such as those perpetrated by the Taliban regime. It is now necessary to determine which subjects of international law may be entitled to adopt concrete sanctions. In general international law, all states may unilaterally decide to have recourse to sanctions on the basis of a violation by a given government of international obligations that have erga omnes character. 87 This conclusion is consistent with the dictum expressed by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case. According to this case, where values are protected by erga omnes obligations, 'all states can be held to have a legal interest to their protection', 88 and thus to react against violators. However, unilateral measures in the absence of a direct injury to the state are not likely. Further, punitive measures are to be used with great caution, since they may give rise to abuse.
The situation would be different if sanctions were to be recommended by UNESCO, particularly by the General Conference, because in such a case they would originate from an institution that represents the international community as a whole. In addition, the risk that sanctions are misused by the states adopting them would be strongly limited by the control that UNESCO exercises with regard to the correct implementation of the sanctions themselves.
In this respect, however, we must note that the authority of UNESCO for adopting sanctions against member states is rather limited. According to the UNESCO Constitution, 89 the organization may impose sanctions only in three well-defined situations. The first, provided for by Article II para. 4, concerns the suspension of members, previously suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership of the United Nations Organization, 'upon request of the latter', from the rights and privileges resulting from the membership of the UNESCO. Secondly, para. 5 of the same article provides that 'Members of the Organization which are expelled from the United Nations Organization shall automatically cease to be Members of this Organization'. Finally, Article IV para. 8(b) states the suspension of the right to vote in the General Conference when 'the total amount of contributions due from [the state] exceeds the total amount of contributions payable by it for the current year and the immediately preceding calendar year'.
There is arguably no basis in the Constitution to affirm that the organization may impose sanctions for violations other than those indicated by the above cited provisions, and outside the strictly precise conditions provided therein. Nevertheless, the practice developed by UNESCO has been rather expansive. In a number of cases, its organs have adopted sanctions against member states (and not members which Among the various sanctions taken against Portugal during that period, is to be emphasized Resolution 9.14 of 1968, in which member states were invited 'to suspend all co-operation with Portugal in the field of education, science and culture'; the text of the Resolution is available in UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, Fifteenth Session, Paris, 1968, Resolutions, at 87 (available online at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114047e.pdf). For a detailed analysis of this practice see Milanesi, supra note 91, at 74. 97 See supra section 4.A. 98 See Milanesi, supra note 91, at 78. collaborated with or were economically supported by UNESCO) that were responsible of violating any of the basic values pursued by the organization. Firstly, in 1964 the General Conference excluded Portugal from participating to the twenty-seventh Conference on Education for the policy of colonialism and racial discrimination perpetrated by this state in the territories (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau) subject to its administration. 90 In that case, although some states parties noted that there was no basis in the UNESCO Constitution for taking measures of that kind, 91 the imposition of sanctions against Portugal was not interrupted until 1974, 92 when Portugal recognized the right to independence of African peoples. 93 This conduct was justified by the General Conference on the grounds that:
. . . the Government of Portugal continues to pursue in the African territories under its domination a policy of colonialism and racial discrimination which deprives the peoples of those territories of their most elementary rights to education and culture, thus violating the fundamental obligations of every member of UNESCO.
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As it has already been noted, 95 such a statement demonstrates the organization's goal to safeguard the fundamental values that lay the foundation of its own Constitution, and the raison d'être of its own existence, in a concrete manner.
Similar measures were taken by UNESCO against Southern Rhodesia in the 1960s, against its policy of apartheid and racial discrimination, and Israel in 1968, against its actions aimed at modifying the cultural integrity of the city of Jerusalem. 96 In both of these cases the sanctions were based on the alleged violation of basic principles pursued by the organization. Nevertheless, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, no particular objection was raised by member states, due to the fact that UNESCO sanctions could be considered as being connected with those implemented by the United Nations, 97 but the question of Israel was strongly debated. 98 In the latter case the General Conference justified the decided measures by emphasizing: the Holy Places, not only to the countries directly concerned but to all humanity, on account of their exceptional cultural, historical and religious value.
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UNESCO sanctions were also adopted against South Africa, beginning in 1964, for the policy of apartheid perpetrated by that state. 100 Finally, a similar policy of exclusion was imposed against Yugoslavia in the 1990s following the events that led to the Balkan wars.
From a strictly formal point of view, all sanctions taken by UNESCO in the cited cases appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In fact, they essentially consisted in the exclusion of a state from participating in the work of the organization and of its subsidiary organs, or in the suspension of the privileges deriving from the membership in the organization, in the absence of an ad hoc enabling provision. Some member states have not failed to point out this alleged inconsistency in a number of cases. However, UNESCO is an international organization founded on the pursuit of certain very precise aims, which are, in essence, fostering science and culture and promoting international cooperation in these fields. As in relations among individuals, when a state becomes member of a group or organization, its purpose is basically to join in the collective pursuit of aims with the other members. Membership in any social group includes an implicit obligation, which is the duty to act in a manner consistent with the basic principles under which the very existence of the group is founded. In other words, it seems crucial to the existence of the group itself that any member may join in the privileges deriving from the membership only if it acts consistently with the aims pursued by the group, since such rights and privileges are precisely granted to achieve these aims. As a consequence, it would be an unacceptable contradiction for a member to enjoy rights and privileges while acting against the basic principles pursued by the organization. Thus, it seems perfectly legitimate that an assembly in which all members are represented may decide to suspend the member acting contrary to basic principles under which the group itself is founded, and such group may prevent that member from enjoying privileges and benefits deriving from its membership in the Organization. The gross and systematic attacks on the ancient cultural heritage of Afghanistan are incompatible with the object and purpose of the UNESCO. They represent a flagrant breach of the principle of moral and intellectual solidarity entrenched in its Constitution, and justify as such the adoption of sanctions against the offending state. The only condition for such sanctions to be lawful is that they are decided by the General Conference, the organ that represents all member states.
If we move from the institutional law of UNESCO or the United Nations to the law of treaties, it is clear that under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 101 parties to the 1972 World Heritage Convention are entitled to suspend or terminate the application of the Convention in their relations with a government 102 For the updated list of states that are members of the organization see the UNESCO web site, at www.unesco.org/general/eng/about/members.shtml committing a material breach of the Convention regardless of a specific treaty provision to this effect.
D Would Sanctions Against the Taliban Regime Have Been Advisable or Useful?
Although sanctions are permissible in the case of the destruction of the Afghan cultural heritage perpetrated by the Taliban, it remains to be seen what kinds of sanctions could be really advisable and useful in such a situation, and which actors should concretely adopt such measures. In this regard, it is essential to remember that, although Afghanistan was a member state of UNESCO at the time of the destruction of the statues, 102 the recognized member was the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and not the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan established by the Taliban. As a non-recognized government, however, the Taliban regime took no advantage or sought no benefit from UNESCO, where the accredited government was another entity. This in itself was meant to be a sanction of non-recognition aimed at isolating and stigmatizing the Taliban regime. In such a situation, therefore, sanctions need to be carefully tailored in order to maximize the effect of the Taliban's isolation and exposure to international shame, without undermining the legitimate government, which did not share the policy of systematic destruction of cultural heritage perpetrated by the Taliban. This would suggest avoiding sanctions that entail institutional measures designed to suspend or terminate membership in the Organization or to restrict the rights of Afghanistan in the work of UNESCO's bodies.
Economic and diplomatic measures, as well as the solemn condemnation of the acts of destruction as crime against culture, are more appropriate sanctions in this context.
When considering economic or trade measures against a country, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, the desperate social and economic situation of the Afghan people after years of war and of oppressive governments must certainly be taken into account. Thus, rather than adopting a full scale embargo, one should use selective sanctions affecting the government's power and denying access to goods and technology that help the regime remain in power. At the same time, diplomatic sanctions, particularly refusals to recognize the rogue government, can be useful in achieving full political isolation in the international community. Regrettably, at the time of the destruction of the Afghan heritage and thereafter, a few important countries continued to recognize the Taliban regime and maintain diplomatic relations with it. It took the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent military campaign against the bases of terrorism in Afghanistan to persuade these countries that the time had come to rescind their ties with the Taliban.
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Economic and political sanctions, obviously, are matters more suitable for the United Nations and individual states, rather than UNESCO, to deal with. The adoption of a solemn Declaration or Recommendation by the General Conference proclaiming the systematic, deliberate and discriminatory destruction of cultural heritage of value for humanity as a crime under international law would be more consistent with UNESCO's purpose and mission. This could serve as a specific condemnation of the Taliban acts and as a precedent for future similar episodes should they occur. Similarly, a body such as the World Heritage Committee, which oversees the most widely ratified UNESCO Convention on the protection of cultural heritage, should follow the path set out by the UNESCO Director General, and propose a draft declaration denouncing the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage by a state party as incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention. 
Individual Criminal Liability
The final question to be addressed is whether the individuals who ordered and/or performed the acts of destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas and other important cultural heritage of Afghanistan may be held responsible under international law and, consequently, be prosecuted for those acts. After the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001, this question may be obscured by the enormous loss of life and the scale of military anti-terror action it has triggered. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for addressing it. Firstly, it may reveal that there are connections between terrorism, 106 On 7 October 2001, after the beginning of the US military attack against Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden himself implicitly confirmed his responsibility for the terrorist acts of 11 September, in a speech broadcast by the television 'Al-Jazeera' of Qatar and transmitted by virtually all the televisions of the world (and wholly or partially reproduced by the main newspapers on 8 October 2001). Such responsibility was later confirmed by his subsequent television messages on 5 November and 26 December. The Taliban, having protected and furnished logistic support to Bin Laden at the time of the terrorist attack, and continued to protect him after such attack, were considered equally responsible for such terrorist acts. 107 The fact that the Bamiyan Buddhas are actually included among cultural assets of outstanding value (consistently with the meaning of 'outstanding' accepted by the main international instruments dealing with cultural heritage) has been already demonstrated; see supra note 46 and corresponding text.
crimes against humanity and crimes against culture. 106 Secondly, even if the crimes against culture stand alone, one must fully understand the general role of international law in punishing such crimes.
Any such incrimination of individuals responsible for the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas and other cultural heritage in Afghanistan must have a sound basis in international law. Accordingly, two conditions must be satisfied: a) the conduct of the person accused must present the 'objective' element of an internationally wrongful act, i.e. the breach of an international obligation; b) such conduct must be 'subjectively' related to a person who can be held accountable under international law.
As for the objective element, the destruction of cultural heritage must first be considered as a crime of individuals punishable under international legal norms. Since international law is a body of law that generally applies to states, its customary rules cannot normally be used with regard to individuals. Nevertheless, this general rule is subject to a relevant exception, which arises when individuals are responsible of certain serious crimes that, by their very nature, affect the international community as a whole, since no human group can tolerate them. These crimes are the so-called crimina juris gentium, or crimes against the peace and the security of mankind, which include crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Can voluntary, systematic destruction of cultural heritage be included in the strict catalogue of these crimes, which traditionally includes only particularly egregious violations such as genocide, slave trade or torture?
As we have pointed out earlier, deliberate destruction of cultural heritage has often occurred throughout history, especially in wartime. Nevertheless, even in the most obscure moments of humanity, destruction and loss of cultural heritage was justified by military necessity or caused by greed for acquisition of valuable objects. The Taliban's systematic destruction of Afghan heritage reaches an unparalleled level of moral degradation in its absence of any justification other religious intolerance and contempt for the opinion of humankind. But, is this sufficient to label their acts as international crimes? 107 International practice in this field indicates deliberate extensive destruction of cultural heritage may be included among international crimes. As we have noted in section 4, the Statute of the ICTY places the destruction of buildings dedicated to religion, or of historical and artistic monuments among war crimes (that are part of the broader concept of crimina juris gentium) 108 in Article 3(d), 109 as is also the case in Articles 8(b)(IX) and 8(c)(Iv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 110 and Article 20(e)(iv) of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 111 While no similar references are to be found in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 112 this may be explained by the negligible impact that the atrocities committed in Rwanda had on cultural heritage of international importance. Further, according to the jurisprudence of the ICTY (which builds on the legacy of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 113 and the International Law Commission), 114 when an act of destruction of cultural heritage is perpetrated with a discriminatory intent, as in the case of the Bamiyan Buddhas, it amounts to an act of persecution included in the concept of crimes against humanity, which is also part of the broader concept of crimina juris gentium. 115 It can thus reasonably be argued that the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of outstanding value, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas, is to be included among those crimes that trigger the international criminal liability of the individuals who commit them. 116 However, the abstract configuration of an act of systematic and discriminatory destruction of cultural property as a crime under international law is not sufficient in itself to entail individual criminal liability before a competent court. In addition, international institutions and procedures actually capable of permitting the prosecution and punishment of the responsible individuals need to be established. As far as international institutions are concerned, no international court or tribunal had 117 In addition, the mere absence of an international criminal court should not be preclude prosecution and punishment of crimes against culture. Every state should be able to prosecute such crimes within the framework of its own national criminal jurisdiction and law. The International Law Commission has correctly recognized the principle of universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law in relation to crimes against the peace and the security of mankind. Article 8 of the International Law Commission Draft Code states that:
[w]ithout prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, each state party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set out in articles 17, 18, 19 and 20, irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed.
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In the commentary to this provision the Commission explains that:
[a]s regards international law, any state party is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over an individual allegedly responsible for a crime under international law set out in articles 17 to 20 who is present in its territory under the principle of 'universal jurisdiction' set forth in article 9 [which establishes the obligation of a state party to extradite or prosecute an individual who is allegedly responsible for such a crime]. The phrase 'irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were committed' is used in the first provision of the present article to avoid any doubt as to the existence of universal jurisdiction for those crimes.
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As for the duty incumbent upon state parties to take all necessary measures adapting their domestic laws to the principle of universal jurisdiction, the commentary then adds that:
The present provision is intended to give effect to the entitlement of state parties to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes set out in articles 17 to 20 under the principle of universal jurisdiction by ensuring that such jurisdiction is appropriately reflected in the national law of each state party. [. . .] Thus, a state party is required to take those measures, if any, that are necessary to enable it to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes set out in articles 17 to 20 in accordance with the relevant provisions of its national law. 121 The Commission confirms that the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes under international law is also part of customary law; 122 and, with specific reference to genocide, it stresses that:
[the] extension [provided for by article 8 of the Draft Code over the crime of genocide set out in article 17 to every state party to the Code] was fully justified in view of the character of the crime of genocide as a crime under international law for which universal jurisdiction existed as a matter of customary law for those states that were not parties to the Convention and therefore not subject to the restriction contained therein. 123 It clearly emerges from this passage that the criterion used by the Commission for singling out crimes which, according to Article 8 of the Draft, are covered by the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, is to group such crimes, 'for which universal jurisdiction existed as a matter of customary law' under international law. In other words, customary international law actually provides any state with the right, if not the moral duty, to exercise its jurisdiction over those crimes. This includes the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage, but only under the condition of the physical presence of the alleged offender in its territory. The reference to the duty for 'each state party [to] take [the] measures [that] may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over [those] crimes', included by the Commission in Article 8, is due to the widespread reluctance shown by many national judges in applying the principle of universality without an ad hoc jurisdictional title provided by their domestic law. In other words, the Commission perceived the necessity to include such a provision in Article 8, to overcome the obstacle lying in the perseverance shown by many national judges who act under the title of universal jurisdiction only when such an application is expressly provided by their national law. 124 However, this does not mean that domestic courts are not entitled to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction simply because there is no domestic rule expressly authorizing them to do so. In all cases where a domestic court actually applied the universality principle, in the absence of ad hoc domestic provisions, 125 no complaint came from any government or other international institutions. 126 As for the 'subjective' element of the crime, the Taliban leaders who ordered the destruction of the two Buddhas are with no doubt internationally responsible for those acts. This is not only stated by customary law and by Article 2.3(b) of the Draft Code, 127 but is also logically confirmed by the fact that those individuals were the only ones with the effective power of deciding the destiny of such monuments. On the other hand, the responsibility of the material executors of the destructive acts is put into question by the exclusive nature of this power. Although the material executors of a crime under international law, which entails individual responsibility, are the individuals primarily responsible for those acts, 128 and the fact of acting pursuant to a superior's order does not exclude, in principle, such responsibility, 129 in our opinion, it is necessary to keep in mind that there was no reasonable opportunity for those persons under the control of the Taliban to oppose such an order without incurring serious punishment or running the risk of losing their life. Such was the case, irrespective of the fact that the execution of such order could give rise to a crimen juris 130 See supra note 74, Article 5. This provision reflects the formulation that was provided for by gentium. With regard to the relevance of the superior order, Article 5 of the Draft Code states that:
The fact that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order of a Government or a superior does not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires.
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This provision seems to exclude in any case that the superior order may cancel the responsibility of the material executor of the act. The commentary to Article 5 confirms this conclusion, by stating that:
The fact that a subordinate unwillingly committed a crime pursuant to an order of a superior to avoid serious consequences for himself or his family resulting from the failure to carry out that order under the circumstances at the time may justify a reduction in the penalty that would otherwise be imposed to take into account the lesser degree of culpability. [. . .] a court may decide that justice requires imposing a lesser punishment on a subordinate who committed a serious crime pursuant to a superior order only to avoid an immediate or otherwise significant risk of equally or more serious consequences resulting from a failure to comply with that order.
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The commentary leaves no room for considering fear for life or personal safety of the material executor of an international crime as a circumstance excluding his responsibility. Such a position corresponds to a consistently reiterated rule in virtually all international instruments pertaining to the field of criminal law, 132 and its validity is recognized in general international law.
Having stated that, several mitigating circumstances might operate in the present situation. First, the majority of the Taliban's armed forces were probably not composed of professional soldiers, supposedly educated to respect the laws and customs of war, but rather of volunteers, irregulars, and civilians often drafted into the armed forces by force. It may be reasonably inferred that this type of individual is less capable of challenging superior orders manifestly incompatible with such laws. Further, given the ruthless nature of the Taliban regime, any refusal to execute superior orders would have surely met with the harshest punishments. The obvious conclusion is that the position of the material executors should be considered with great caution in the event of a trial. However, these mitigating circumstances should not be considered where the accused individuals fully shared the abject determination of their leaders in destroying the monuments and the other cultural objects of the Afghan pre-Islamic heritage. 133 See supra note 76 and corresponding text.
Conclusion
Few events have caused as much shock and condemnation within the international community in recent years as did the destruction of the great Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001. Individual states, international organizations, such as the United Nations and UNESCO, religious authorities, including some of the most influential Islamic authorities, NGOs and people all over the world have called for international mobilization against such acts of barbarity and religious intolerance. Does this make such acts wrongful under international law? If so, what kind of legal response is possible in the current normative and institutional context? This article has aimed at providing a preliminary assessment of these questions in light of contemporary international practice. As to the first question, our conclusion is rather promising. As with fundamental human rights, first, and in the area of environmental protection, later, states may no longer invoke their sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction in order to justify acts of deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great importance for humanity as a whole. This analysis has also tried to demonstrate that when such destruction is associated with the intent to discriminate or annihilate another religion and its forms of cultural expression, the act then amounts to a crime of persecution. In contemporary international law, the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great importance as the Buddhas of Bamiyan not only constitutes an intolerable offence against the cultural heritage of humanity, but, when carried out with a discriminatory intent, it also amounts to an attack on the very identity of the targeted people and religion, and thus on the dignity and fundamental rights of its members. As the ICTY recently confirmed such discriminatory destruction '. . . manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes against humanity', for all of humanity is indeed injured '. 133 As to the second question, we have tried to identify possible sanctions at two different levels: that of the international responsibility of the Taliban regime as the de facto government of Afghanistan at the time of the planning and execution of the act of destruction, and that of the criminal liability of the individuals who participated in the decision and implementation of the plan to demolish the Buddhas. At the first level, we have identified several precedents in which sanctions were adopted by the United Nations and by UNESCO. However, given the almost complete isolation in which the Taliban government was in 2001, as a consequence of the UN sanctions, it is difficult to imagine what kind of effective measure could have been adopted to sanction the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan aside from those already in force against the Taliban under the 1999-2000 Security Council resolutions. At the second level, our analysis has shown a more promising trend toward ensuring individual accountability for international crimes. International humanitarian law, the statutes of the ICTY and of the International Criminal Court, as well as the specific provisions to be found in the most recent normative instruments concerning the protection of cultural property in armed conflicts, all converge toward the recognition of the principle that deliberate destruction of cultural heritage is a matter of concern, not only for the people who own that heritage, but for humanity as a whole. Perhaps, with the Taliban now removed from the government in Afghanistan, the international community, and particularly UNESCO, should undertake the task of formulating a restatement of this principle by drafting and adopting a solemn declaration on the obligation for all states to respect cultural heritage located in their territory, and representing the variety of spiritual and religious traditions of the world. This would be consistent with the recently adopted UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity; 134 constitute the first step toward a more comprehensive protection of cultural heritage in international law; and, certainly, give concrete meaning to the ideal of moral and intellectual solidarity toward which all member states should strive under the 1945 UNESCO Constitution. 136 This confirms the conclusion sustained by the authors in this article that the Buddhas of Bamiyan represented an element of general interest to humanity in the safeguarding of cultural heritage.
